Generalized signcryption (GSC) can be applied as an encryption scheme, a signature scheme, or a signcryption scheme with only one algorithm and one key pair. A key-insulated mechanism can resolve the private key exposure problem. To ensure the security of cloud storage, we introduce the key-insulated mechanism into GSC and propose a concrete scheme without bilinear pairings in the certificateless cryptosystem setting. We provide a formal definition and a security model of certificateless key-insulated GSC. Then, we prove that our scheme is confidential under the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption and unforgeable under the elliptic curve discrete logarithm (EC-DL) assumption. Our scheme also supports both random-access key update and secure key update. Finally, we evaluate the efficiency of our scheme and demonstrate that it is highly efficient. Thus, our scheme is more suitable for users who communicate with the cloud using mobile devices.
Introduction
With the rapid development of cloud storage technology, its security has become increasingly important. For cloud storage, confidentiality and authentication are the two main aspects of security that must be addressed. In general, confidentiality can be realized by encryption and authentication via signature. When both methods are needed simultaneously, the sign-then-encrypt approach is traditionally utilized. However, in this traditional method, the computational costs and communication overhead are the sum of those of signature and encryption, being very high. Signcryption [1] can realize both confidentiality and authentication simultaneously in a single logic step, and the cost is much lower than that of the traditional approach.
Zheng's original signcryption scheme [1] is based on the public key infrastructure (PKI), whose drawback is the high management cost of the public key certificate. An identitybased cryptosystem [2] can greatly reduce the cost of public key management, but it suffers from the private key escrow problem (i.e., the trusted third-party private key generator [PKG] knows all users' private keys).
In 2003, Al-Riyami and Paterson [3] proposed the certificateless cryptosystem, for which a user's private key is composed of two parts: the partial-private key produced by the trusted third-party key generation center (KGC) and a secret value chosen by the user. Accordingly, a user's public key is also composed of two parts: the user's identity information and the public key corresponding to the secret value. Because the public key does not require a certificate, the cost of public key management is greatly reduced. Meanwhile, the KGC does not know the user's secret value, and thus, there is no private key escrow problem. Certificateless cryptosystems have attracted widespread attention since their introduction.
Returning to cloud storage, we sometimes need confidentiality and authentication separately, whereas, at other times, both are needed simultaneously. For example, an announcement needs only authentication, private information requires only confidentiality, and information sent to others needs both. To meet this requirement, we can use three algorithms (i.e., encryption, signature, and signcryption). However, three algorithms require three pairs of keys, and hence, the key management cost is high. To reduce the complexity of key management and increase 2 Security and Communication Networks the flexibility of implementation, Han et al. [4] proposed the concept of generalized signcryption (GSC) in 2006, which is the natural extension of signcryption. GSC can realize encryption, signature, and signcryption with only one algorithm and one key pair. Because it can adaptively switch between encryption mode, signature mode, and signcryption mode, GSC can realize confidentiality and authentication separately/simultaneously in an efficient manner. Therefore, we can use GSC to achieve confidentiality and authentication separately/simultaneously in a cloud storage scenario.
In Han et al. 's original GSC scheme [4] , however, the private key exposure problem was not considered. With the widespread use of mobile devices, key exposure has become a serious and realistic threat. If an attacker can obtain a victim's private key, he/she does not need to solve the hard problems on which the cryptosystem is based. To minimize the damage caused by private key exposure, forward-secure [5] , key-insulated [6] , and intrusion-resilient [7] technologies have been introduced. In forward-secure technology, the lifetime of a system is divided into separate time periods. At the beginning of each time period, a user's private key must be updated, whileas the public key remains unchanged throughout the lifetime. Thus, the private key exposure of a given time period affects only the security of the current and later time periods, while the previous time periods are protected. Thus, the attacker cannot decrypt the encryption and signcryption ciphertexts in the previous time periods and also cannot forge the signature and signcryption ciphertexts in the previous time periods. As forward-secure technology does not provide backward security, key-insulated technology has been introduced. In this technology, a physically secure but computationally limited device (the helper) is introduced and stores a helper private key. The lifetime of a system is divided into separate time periods, as in forward-security technology. When a user's private key is updated at the beginning of a time period, the helper is needed to produce an update key. The user updates his/her private key by combining the update key and his/her old time period private key. The public key remains unchanged throughout the lifetime, as in the forwardsecure technology. The signature, signcryption, decryption, and un-signcryption computations need only the user's current time period private key, and the helper is not involved. Thus, a user's private key being compromised in some given time periods does not affect the security of other time periods. Therefore, both forward and backward security are achieved. In addition, if the helper's private key is exposed, as long as the user's period private key in each time period is not exposed, security will be guaranteed. However, if the helper's private key is exposed at the same time that the user's private key in any time period is exposed, both forward and backward security will be breached. In intrusion-resilient technology, at the beginning of each time period, both the user's private key and the helper's private key must be updated. Thus, it retains the advantage of a key-insulated system while gaining the following advantages. If the helper's private key is exposed in a given time period, both forward and backward security will still hold as long as the user's private key is not exposed within the same time period. If the helper's private key and the user's private key are exposed in the same time period, forward security will be maintained. Obviously, key-insulated technology is more secure than forward-security technology, and intrusion-resilient technology is more secure than key-insulated technology. Due to the complexity and low efficiency of the current intrusionresilient technology, here, we consider only key-insulated technology.
In this paper, we introduce key-insulated technology into GSC for the first time and propose a certificateless keyinsulated GSC scheme to meet the security requirements of cloud storage. Our scheme has the following advantages. First, we use only one algorithm and one key pair to realize the key-insulated encryption, key-insulated signature, and key-insulated signcryption functions. The algorithm can switch between the encryption, signature, and signcryption modes adaptively. Therefore, it can realize confidentiality and authentication separately or simultaneously, and the total number of keys in the system is greatly reduced. Second, the user's private keys may be exposed during some time periods, whereas they are not affected in other time periods. Third, our scheme possesses the advantages of a certificateless cryptosystem: low public key management costs and no private key escrow problem. Fourth, our scheme does not rely on costly bilinear pairings. Bilinear pairing is a useful tool in the design of cryptography schemes, but the computational cost of a pairing can be almost 20 times that of elliptic curve point multiplication [8] . Therefore, the computational efficiency of our scheme is high. Fifth, our scheme supports unbounded time periods. In comparison, in the first key-insulated scheme [6] , the total number of time periods must be given in advance. Sixth, our scheme supports random-access key update; that is, for any current time period and any desired time period , the private key can be updated from sk to sk in one step. Seventh, our scheme supports secure key update. We considered the possibility that an adversary may break into the user's storage while a key update is occurring. In this scenario, a key update exposure from time period to is equivalent to key exposures in time periods and . Other time periods remain secure.
We give a formal definition and the security concept of certificateless key-insulated GSC. Based on the CDH hard problem, we prove that our scheme is confidential in both encryption and signcryption modes. Based on the EC-DL hard problem, we prove that our scheme is unforgeable in both signature and signcryption modes. Finally, we evaluate the efficiency of our scheme and demonstrate that it is highly efficient.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, various related works are described. Section 3 addresses various hard problems. In Section 4, the formal definition and security model are introduced. Section 5 presents the concrete certificateless key-insulated GSC scheme without bilinear pairings. In Section 6, we analyze the security of our scheme. In Section 7, we evaluate the efficiency of our scheme. We conclude the paper in Section 8.
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Related Work
Han et al. [4] first introduced the notion of GSC in 2006. Subsequently, Han and Gui [9] described a multireceiver GSC scheme and applied it to wireless multicast communication in 2009. Wang et al. [10] gave a formal definition and security model of GSC in the PKI setting for the first time and improved the scheme [4] in 2010. Later, Yu et al. [11] proposed an identity-based GSC scheme and a security model in the same year. Kushwah and Lal [12] simplified the security model of scheme [11] and proposed a more efficient identitybased GSC scheme in 2011. Zhou et al. [13] proposed a certificateless GSC scheme that can resist a malicious-butpassive KGC attack [14] in 2014. Wei et al. [15] proposed an identity-based GSC scheme in the standard model and applied it to big data security in 2015. Zhou [16] described an attack on scheme [9] and improved it in the same year. Subsequently, Han and Lu [17] proposed an attribute-based GSC scheme in the standard model and applied it to online social networks. Zhou et al. [18, 19] extended GSC, introduced two new concepts (generalized proxy signcryption and generalized ring signcryption), and proposed a concrete scheme in 2016. Zhang et al. [20] proposed a lightweight certificateless GSC scheme and applied it to a mobile health system in 2017.
Key-insulated encryption was first introduced by Dodis et al. [6] in 2002. Dodis et al. [21] extended the key-insulated encryption to a key-insulated signature and proposed a concrete scheme in 2003. However, in the two schemes, the total number of time periods must be given in advance. Hanaoka et al. [22] introduced key-insulated encryption into the identity-based setting and proposed an identity-based hierarchical key-insulated encryption scheme in 2005. Zhou et al. [23] proposed the first identity-based key-insulated signature in 2006. Weng et al. [24] developed an identitybased key-insulated signature in the standard model in the same year. Subsequently, Hanaoka et al. [25] introduced parallel key-insulated encryption and proposed some concrete schemes. Later, Bellare and Palacio [26] proposed a keyinsulated encryption scheme in which the total number of time periods does not need to be determined in advance in the PKI setting. Li et al. [27] introduced the key-insulated mechanism into the group signature and proposed a concrete scheme in 2007. Liu and Wong [28] introduced the keyinsulated mechanism into the ring signature and proposed a concrete scheme in 2008. Wan et al. [29] proposed the first certificateless key-insulated signature in 2009; their scheme was designed in the standard model. In the same year, Liu and Cao [30] noted that scheme [24] is insecure. Later, Wan et al. [31] introduced a key-insulated mechanism into the proxy signature and proposed a concrete scheme. Du et al. [32] proposed the first certificate-based key-insulated signature in 2012. Chen et al. [33] proposed the first key-insulated signcryption in the same year and proved their scheme in the standard model. Fan et al. [34] proposed a PKI-based keyinsulated signcryption scheme, and Wang et al. [35] suggested an identity-based key-insulated signcryption scheme in 2013. Zhao et al. [36] introduced the key-insulated mechanism into the aggregate signature and proposed a concrete scheme in 2014. Chen et al. [37] proposed the first attribute-based key-insulated signature and applied it to anonymous authentication for a bidirectional broadcasting service in the same year. Subsequently, Zhu et al. [38] determined that scheme [33] is insecure and reported an improvement. Li et al. [39] proposed a certificate-based key-insulated signature scheme in the same year. Xiong et al. [40] proposed a pairingfree certificate-based key-insulated signature scheme for lowpower devices, and Lu et al. [41] proposed a certificateless strong key-insulated signature in the standard model in 2015. Li et al. [42] proposed a certificate-based key-insulated signature in the standard model in 2016. Hong and Sun [43] proposed an attribute-based key-insulated signcryption without bilinear pairings and applied it to mobile networks during the same year.
Preliminaries
(1) Elliptic curve discrete logarithm (EC-DL) problem:
let be an elliptic curve over the finite field , where is a prime number, and let 1 be an additive group of prime order on ( ). Given ( , ) ∈ for unknown randomly chosen ∈ , one must compute .
(2) Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem:
given ( , , ) ∈ 3 1 for unknown randomly chosen , ∈ , one must compute .
Formal Definition and Security Model of Certificateless Key-Insulated GSC
Formal Definition.
A certificateless key-insulated GSC scheme consists of the following eight algorithms.
(1) Setup. Given a security parameter 1 , it produces a master private key and a global public parameter Params. It is usually run by the KGC.
(2) Partial-Private-Key-Gen. Given a user's identity ID, the Params, and the master private key , it produces a partial private key ID for the user. It is also usually run by the KGC, and the KGC sends ID to the user securely. [6] : (1) ordinary key exposure, which involves the user-period-private key being compromised; (2) key-update exposure, which involves the user's device being compromised during the key-updating step; and (3) helper-key exposure, which involves the physically secure device being compromised. Security against the first type of exposure is called basic key-insulated security, security against the second type of exposure is called secure key update, and security against the last type of exposure is called strong key-insulated security. Compromising both the userperiod-private key and helper key is not allowed because, in this case, the adversary can compute the user-period-private key in any time period.
The security of GSC includes confidentiality and unforgeability. Specifically, the scheme must possess indistinguishability under an adaptively chosen ciphertext attack in encryption and signcryption modes and unforgeability under an adaptively chosen message attack in signature and signcryption modes.
By referring to the security models of schemes [6, 13, 33, 34, 39, 41] , we have the following nine definitions. The first four definitions focus on the first type of exposure, Definitions 5-8 focus on the last type of exposure, and Definition 9 focuses on the second type of exposure.
There are nine oracles that can be accessed by adversary as follows.
(a) User-Creation Query. Adversary provides an identity ID. If it has been created, returns the public key PK ID to . Otherwise, runs the partial-key-gen and user-key-gen algorithms to produce the partial private key ID and the user's secret-value/public key pair ( ID , PK ID ). runs the setinitial-key algorithm to produce the helper private key hk ID . Then, returns the public key PK ID to .
(b) Partial-Private-Key Query. provides a created identity ID, and returns the partial private key ID to .
(c) Secret-Value Query. provides a created identity ID, and returns the secret value ID to .
(d) Public-Key Query. provides a created identity ID, and returns the public key PK ID to .
(e) Public-Key-Replacement Query. provides a created identity ID and a new public/secret-value pair (PK ID , ID ), and replaces the old public/secret-value pair (PK ID , ID ) with the new one (PK ID , ID ).
provides a created identity ID and a time period , and returns the user's period private key ID, to (first running the key-update-h and keyupdate-u algorithms, if necessary).
(g) Helper-Key Query. provides a created identity ID. returns the user's helper key hk ID to .
(h) GSC Query. provides two created identities {ID , ID } (one of them may be null), a message , and a time period .
runs the GSC algorithm and returns its output to .
(i) Un-GSC Query. provides two created identities {ID , ID } (one of them may be null), a ciphertext , and a time period . runs the Un-GSC algorithm and returns its results to .
Basic Key-Insulated Security
Definition 1 (type I confidentiality, encryption, and signcryption modes). A certificateless key-insulated GSC scheme is said to be indistinguishability-certificateless-basic key-insulated-GSC-adaptive chosen ciphertext attack-type I (IND-CL-Basic-KI-GSC-CCA2-I) secure if no probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary I has a nonnegligible advantage in the following game.
(1) Setup. Given a security parameter 1 , challenger runs the setup algorithm to produce the system public parameter Params and a master private key . He/she returns Params to adversary I and keeps secret. I 's advantage is defined as Adv
Note. In the above Challenge stage, the sender's identity ID * may be null. In this case, it runs in encryption mode; otherwise it runs in signcryption mode. Thus, the encryption and signcryption modes share the same game, as described above.
Definition 2 (type II confidentiality, encryption, and signcryption modes). A certificateless key-insulated GSC scheme is said to be IND-CL-Basic-KI-GSC-CCA2-II secure if no PPT adversary II has a nonnegligible advantage in the following game.
(1) Setup. Given a security parameter 1 , adversary II runs the setup algorithm to produce the system public parameter Params and a master private key . He/she returns Params and to challenger . II 's advantage is defined as Adv
Note 1. In the above Challenge stage, the sender's identity ID * may be null. In this case, it runs in encryption mode; otherwise, it runs in signcryption mode. Thus, the encryption and signcryption modes share the same game, as described above.
Note 2.
To resist the malicious-but-passive KGC attack, it must let adversary II produce the system parameters Params and master private key in the Setup stage.
Definition 3 (type I unforgeability, signature, and signcryption modes). A certificateless key-insulated GSC scheme is said to be existentially unforgeable-certificateless-basic keyinsulated-GSC-adaptive chosen message attack-type I (EUF-CL-Basic-KI-GSC-CMA-I) secure if no PPT adversary I has a nonnegligible advantage in the following game.
(1) Setup. The same as in Definition 1. I 's advantage is its probability of victory.
Note. In the above Forgery stage, the receiver's identity ID * may be null. In this case, it runs in signature mode; otherwise, it runs in signcryption mode. Thus, the signature and signcryption modes share the same game, as described above.
Definition 4 (type II unforgeability, signature, and signcryption modes). A certificateless key-insulated GSC scheme is said to be EUF-CL-Basic-KI-GSC-CMA-II secure if no PPT adversary II has a nonnegligible advantage in the following game.
(1) Setup. The same as in Definition 2. II 's advantage is its probability of victory.
Strong Key-Insulated Security
Definition 5 (type I confidentiality, encryption, and signcryption modes). A certificateless key-insulated GSC scheme is said to be IND-CL-Strong-KI-GSC-CCA2-I secure if no PPT adversary I has a nonnegligible advantage in the following game.
(1) Setup. The same as in Definition 1. I 's advantage is defined as Adv
Note. In the above Challenge stage, the sender's identity ID * may be null. In this case, it runs in encryption mode; otherwise, it runs in signcryption mode. Thus, the encryption and signcryption modes share the same game, as described above.
Definition 6 (type II confidentiality, encryption, and signcryption modes). A certificateless key-insulated GSC scheme is said to be IND-CL-Strong-KI-GSC-CCA2-II secure if no PPT adversary II has a nonnegligible advantage in the following game.
(1) Setup. The same as in Definition 2.
(2) Find Stage. II can adaptively ask all the above oracles except the user-period-private-key, partial-private-key, and public-key-replacement oracles. II 's advantage is defined as Adv
Note 2. To resist the malicious-but-passive KGC attack, it must let adversary II produce the system parameters Params and master private key in the Setup stage.
Definition 7 (type I unforgeability, signature, and signcryption modes). A certificateless key-insulated GSC scheme is said to be EUF-CL-Strong-KI-GSC-CMA-I secure if no PPT adversary I has a nonnegligible advantage in the following game.
(1) Setup. The same as in Definition 5. (c) (
is not the output of the GSC query.
I 's advantage is its probability of victory.
Definition 8 (type II unforgeability, signature, and signcryption modes). A certificateless key-insulated GSC scheme is said to be EUF-CL-Strong-KI-GSC-CMA-II secure if no PPT adversary II has a nonnegligible advantage in the following game.
(1) Setup. The same as in Definition 6. II 's advantage is its probability of victory.
Secure Key Update
Definition 9. A certificateless key-insulated GSC scheme is said to support secure key update if a key update exposure from time period to is equivalent to user-period-privatekey exposures in both time periods and . Key-Update-U. Given the update key (uk ID, , , ID, ) , the user ID updates his/her period private key from time period to as ID, = ID, + uk ID, , . Then, he/she broadcasts ID, .
A Concrete
GSC. Let ∈ {0, 1} , let the sender's identity be ID , let the receiver's identity be ID , and let the time period be . The sender randomly chooses 1 , 2 ∈ * and computes
, and = ( ‖ ) ⊕ ℎ 6 . Finally, the output is ( , ) = ( , ( 1 , 2 , ) ).
This algorithm can be run in three modes. We add a tag in the ciphertext. (ID , ID , ID , , ), ℎ 4 = 4 ( , 1 , 2 , ID , ID ,  ID , ID , , ID , ID , ID ) , and ℎ 5 = 5 ( , 1 , 2 ,  ID , ID , , ID , ID , ID ) and verifies whether ⋅ = ( ID + pub ⋅ ℎ 0,ID + ID ⋅ ℎ 2,ID + ID , ⋅ ℎ 3,ID , + ID ⋅ ℎ 1,ID , ) ⋅ ℎ 4 + 1 ⋅ ℎ 5 + 2 holds true or not. If it does, he/she accepts it.
Correctness
(1)
5.3. Random-Access Key Update. Obviously, our scheme supports random-access key update; thus, for any current time period and any desired time period , the private key can be updated from sk to sk in one step. 
Security Analysis of the Proposed Scheme
Confidentiality of Basic Key Insulation
Theorem 10 (type I confidentiality). In the random oracle model, if there is a PPT adversary with a nonnegligible advantage against the IND-CL-Basic-KI-GSC-CCA2-I security of the scheme running in encryption or
⋅ (1 − 1/ -) --⋅ (1 − 1/ -) --⋅( Un-GSC /2 ) in time < +(7⋅ +8⋅ Un-GSC )⋅ ,
3
. I supplies a tuple (ID, ID , ID, , ) . first checks list 3 to determine whether it contains the item (ID, ID , ID, , , ℎ 3,ID, ) . If it does, returns ℎ 3,ID, . Otherwise, randomly selects ℎ 3,ID, ∈ * and repeats the process until ℎ 3,ID, is not in list 3 . stores the tuple (ID, ID , ID, , , ℎ 3,ID, ) in list 3 and returns ℎ 3,ID, to I . 4 Query. I supplies a tuple ( , 1 , 2 , ID , ID , ID , ID , ,  ID , ID , ID ) . first checks list 4 to determine whether it contains the item ( , 1 , 2 , ID , ID , ID , ID inserts the tuple (ID, , ID, , ID, , ID, ) into list Pe-k and returns ( ID, , ID, ).
(2) ID = ID . aborts.
GSC Query. I provides two created identities {ID , ID } (one of them may be null), a message , and a time period . If ID is null, it is equal to an encryption oracle, which only requires the public parameters. Otherwise, we consider two cases.
(1) ID ̸ = ID . runs the GSC algorithm as normal because can obtain the private key ID , of ID in time period .
(2) ID = ID .
first checks list Pe-k to determine whether it contains the item (ID , , ID , , ID 
If this occurs, retrieves ID , ID , and hk ID from list , and it retrieves ID , * and ID , * from list Pe-k . makes associated hash oracle queries to obtain ℎ 0,ID , ℎ 1,ID , * , ℎ 2,ID , and ℎ 3,ID , * . Then, can output
. Now, we assess the probability of success. In the Challenge stage, the probability that ID * = ID is 1/ U-C . In both the partial-private-key and user-period-private-key queries, the probability of querying ID is 1/ U-C . In the Un-GSC stage, the probability of refusing the right ciphertext is less than Un-GSC /2 .
In terms of the time complexity, GSC and Un-GSC queries need 7 and 8 computations, respectively. , , and Pe-k , which are initially empty. randomly selects ∈ {1, 2, . . . , U-C }.
Find Stage. II makes queries to the following oracles adaptively: 0 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , public-key, user-periodprivate-key, GSC, and Un-GSC queries are the same as in Theorem 10. The partial-private-key and public-key-replacement queries are not needed for II .
User-Creation Query. II provides an identity ID. looks up list to determine whether it contains the item. If it does, returns ID's public key ID and public parameters ( ID , ID ) to II . Otherwise, proceeds as follows and returns public key ID and public parameters ( ID , ID ) to II . randomly selects ID ∈ * and computes ID = ID ⋅ and ID = ID + ⋅ 0 (ID, ID )mod . randomly selects hk ID ∈ * as the helper private key and computes ID = hk ID ⋅ .
(1) ID = ID . sets the public key as ID = and inserts the tuple (ID , ID , ID , − 
If this occurs, retrieves ID and hk ID from list as well as ID , * and ID , * from list Pe-k . makes associated hash oracles to obtain ℎ 0,ID , ℎ 1,ID , * , ℎ 2,ID , and ℎ 3,ID , * . Then, can output
Now, we assess the probability of success. In the challenge stage, the probability that ID * = ID is 1/ U-C . In both the secret-value and user-period-private-key queries, the probability of querying ID is 1/ U-C . In the Un-GSC stage, the probability of refusing the right ciphertext is less than
In terms of the time complexity, GSC and Un-GSC queries need 7 and 8 computations, respectively. Proof. Suppose that challenger is given ( , ) ∈ 2 1 for random ∈ * . does not know the value of and is asked to compute . To utilize adversary I , challenger will simulate all the oracles defined in Definition 3.
Unforgeability of Basic Key Insulation
Theorem 12 (type I unforgeability). In the random oracle model, if there is a PPT adversary with a nonnegligible advantage against the EUF-CL-Basic-KI-GSC-CMA-I secu-
Setup. The same as in Theorem 10.
Queries. The same as in Theorem 10. 
0,ID , ℎ * (1)
0,ID , ℎ * (3) 4 ), and (ID , ID * , * , * (4) , ℎ
0,ID , ℎ * (4) 4 ), where ℎ (2) 4
Then, can compute
Now, we assess the probability of success. In the Forgery stage, the probability of ID * = ID is 1/ U-C . In both the partial-private-key and user-period-private-key queries, the probability of querying with ID is 1/ U-C . In the Un-GSC stage, the probability of refusing the right ciphertext is less than Un-GSC /2 . In conjunction with the multiple-forking lemma, the EC-DL problem can be solved with probability 
2,ID , ℎ * (1)
2,ID , ℎ * (3) 4 ), and (ID , ID * , * , * (4) , ℎ
2,ID , ℎ * (4) 4 ), where ℎ
2,ID and ℎ 
2,ID ) −1 = .
Now, we assess the probability of success. In the Challenge stage, the probability of ID * = ID is 1/ U-C . In both the secret-value and user-period-private-key queries, the probability of querying ID is 1/ U-C . In the Un-GSC stage, the probability of refusing the right ciphertext is less than Un-GSC /2 . In conjunction with the multiple-forking lemma, the EC-GDL problem can be solved with probability
. In terms of the time complexity, GSC and Un-GSC queries need 7 and 8 computations, respectively. Proof. The proof is almost the same as that of Theorem 10. The difference is that I cannot make a user-period-private-key query but can adaptively ask the helper-key oracle. The GSC oracle is also slightly different.
Confidentiality of Strong Key Insulation
Helper-Key Query. I provides a created identity ID and a time period . returns the user's helper key hk ID and the ephemeral variable ID, in time period to I . GSC Query. I provides two created identities {ID , ID } (one of them may be null), a message , and a time period . If ID is null, it is equal to an encryption oracle, which needs only the public parameters. Otherwise, we consider two cases.
(1) ID ̸ = ID .
first checks list Pe-k to determine whether it contains the item (ID , , ID , , ID Proof. The proof is almost the same as that of Theorem 11. The difference is that II cannot make a user-period-private-key query but can adaptively ask the helper-key oracle.
The user-creation query, secret-value query, public-key query, and Un-GSC queries are the same as in Theorem 11.
The helper-key query and GSC query are the same as in Theorem 14. 
Unforgeability of Strong Key Insulation
in time < + (7 ⋅ + 8 ⋅ Un-GSC ) ⋅ , where denotes the time for a scalar multiplication on 1 .
Proof. The proof is almost the same as that of Theorem 12. The difference is that I cannot make a user-period-private-key query but can adaptively ask the helper-key oracle.
All the oracle queries are the same as in Theorem 14. Proof. The proof is almost the same as that of Theorem 13. The difference is that II cannot make a user-period-private-key query but can adaptively ask the helper-key oracle.
All the oracle queries are the same as in Theorem 15.
Secure Key Update
Theorem 18. Our certificateless key-insulated GSC scheme supports secure key update.
Proof. If an adversary compromises the user's storage while a key is being updated from time period to , then he/she can obtain the user's period private key ID, in time period and the update key uk ID, , from to . Then, he/she can compute the user's period private key ID, = ID, + uk ID, , in time period . The adversary cannot obtain any other useful information except ID, , uk ID, , , and ID, . In addition, from the equation ID, = ID + ID ⋅ ℎ 2,ID + ID, ⋅ ℎ 3,ID, + hk ID ⋅ ℎ 1,ID, mod , he/she cannot derive any private information because the number of unknown variables is greater than the number of equations. Furthermore, he/she cannot derive any private information from the equation uk ID, , = ID, ⋅ ℎ 3,ID, − ID, ⋅ ℎ 3,ID, + hk ID ⋅ (ℎ 1,ID, − ℎ 1,ID, )mod either.
Efficiency Comparison of the Proposed Scheme
Because a certificateless key-insulated signcryption scheme has yet to be proposed and because only five key-insulated signcryption schemes have been reported in the literature, we compare the performance of our scheme in signcryption mode with these schemes. [38] , and Hong and Sun's attribute-based key-insulated signcryption scheme [43] . Their common computations are setinitial-key, key-update-h, key-update-u, signcryption, and un-signcryption. The comparisons are presented in Tables 1  and 2 . The symbols , 1 , 2 , and denote a pairing computation, a pairing-based scalar multiplication computation on 1 , an ECC-based scalar multiplication computation on 1 , and an exponentiation computation on 2 , respectively. Other computations are ignored because they are not time consuming. | 1 |, | 2 |, | |, | |, and |ID| represent the bit length of an element on 1 , 2 , and * , a message , and an identity, respectively. "S" denotes the standard model. "ROM" denotes the random oracle model. S-I-K, K-U-H, K-U-U, Sc, and Un-Sc denote set-initial-key, key-update-h, key-updateu, signcryption, and un-signcryption, respectively. To show the comparisons more directly, we use the Multiprecision Integer and Rational Arithmetic C Library (MIRACL) [46] to test the runtime of the basic cryptographic operations. The average runtime is shown in Table 3 (we tested it 1000 times). The experiment was run on a Windows 7 Home Basic 64-bit operating system. The hardware consisted of an Intel Core i7-4510U CPU running at 2.0 GHz with 8 GB of memory. For pairing-based schemes, we use the supersingular elliptic curve / : 2 = 3 − 3 with an embedding degree of 2, where is a 160-bit Solinas prime = 2 159 +2 17 +1 and is a 512-bit prime satisfying +1 = 2 ℎ. Its security level is equivalent to 80-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). To achieve the same security level, for elliptic curve cryptography-(ECC-) based schemes, we use secp160r1, which is recommended by Certicom Corporation [47] .
When we take the above parameters, for pairing-based schemes, | 1 | = | 2 | = 1024 and | | = 160; for ECC-based schemes, | 1 | = 320 and | | = 160. Let | | = 160. We can obtain Table 4 by combining Tables 1, 2, and 3 . From Table 4 , we can see that scheme [43] is the most efficient one in the S-I-K and K-U-H stages. Our scheme is very similar to scheme [43] and outperforms other schemes. In the Sc and Un-Sc stages, our scheme is the most efficient scheme. Scheme [43] is very similar to our scheme, whereas other schemes are much less efficient than our scheme. In terms of ciphertext size, our scheme is the shortest.
We also compared our scheme with two certificateless GSC schemes. These schemes are Zhou et al. 's scheme [13] and Zhang et al. 's scheme [20] . The comparisons are shown in Table 5 . Let |ID| = 160, and we can obtain Table 6 by  combining Tables 3 and 5 .
From Table 6 , we can see that scheme [20] is the most efficient scheme in terms of Sc, Un-Sc, and ciphertext size. Scheme [20] is a lightweight scheme and achieves the greatest efficiency. Our scheme is very similar to this scheme and outperforms scheme [13] . None of the schemes [13, 20] consider the private key exposure problem, whereas our scheme achieves high efficiency even after considering this problem.
In general, the efficiency of our scheme is very similar to those of the lightweight schemes [20, 43] ; therefore, our scheme is more suitable for users who communicate with the cloud using mobile devices.
Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a certificateless key-insulated GSC scheme without bilinear pairings. Our scheme can be used to ensure cloud storage security. We provide a formal definition and security model of certificateless key-insulated GSC. Our scheme is demonstrated to be confidential under the CDH assumption and unforgeable under the EC-DL assumption, and it supports both random-access key update and secure key update. Efficiency evaluations show that our scheme is efficient compared with current key-insulated signcryption schemes and certificateless GSC schemes. Our future work will include designing highly efficient intrusion-resilient GSC schemes.
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